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The discovery of the Higgs particle required a signal of five sigma significance. The 
rigid application of that condition is a convention that disregards more specific 
aspects of the given experiment. In particular, it does not account for the 
characteristics of the look elsewhere effect in the individual experimental context. 
The paper relates this aspect of data analysis to the question as to what extent 
theoretical reasoning should be admitted to play a role in the assessment of the 
significance of empirical data.  
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1: Introduction 
In July 2012, CERN announced the discovery of a scalar particle that was likely to be 
the Higgs particle, the last by then unconfirmed prediction of the standard model of particle 
physics (ATLAS 2012, CMS 2012). Based on further improvements of the data, this 
discovery has by now been acknowledged as the discovery of a Higgs particle.
1
  
Already in December 2011, CERN had first announced indications for a Higgs particle 
at both LHC experiments, ATLAS and CMS, with a combined significance of nearly 4σ. 
Since the agreed upon statistical limit for acknowledging a discovery in particle physics was 
5σ, that data amounted to significant evidence for a new scalar particle but did not constitute a 
discovery. The present paper focuses on the epistemic status of the Higgs particle between 
December 2011 and July 2012. Assessments of the December 2011 data could be divided into 
two clearly discernible ‘camps’. Those who adhered to the letter of the definition of a 
discovery in particle physics recommended caution and warned against being overly confident 
based on insufficient data. Others, however, emphasized the striking coherence of the data 
with theoretical knowledge about the Higgs particle and, on that basis, argued that the 
evidence for the Higgs was stronger than suggested by the formal statistical analysis. This 
disagreement reflected a substantial conceptual difference of opinion regarding the overall 
take on empirical confirmation: it hinged on the question how to evaluate the ‘look elsewhere 
effect’ in the given case.2 The present article analyses this conceptual disagreement, which 
points towards a more general question about the epistemological status of measurement in 
high energy physics and may be expected to be of increasing importance in the future. 
After a brief characterization of the Higgs particle and the look elsewhere effect in 
Sections 2 and 3, the core problem associated with interpreting the data is presented in 
Section 4 by defining two different perspectives on the status of measurements in high energy 
physics. This discussion is followed by a brief assessment of the significance of the ensuing 
analysis in Section 5. Section 6 construes the two perspectives in terms of the distinction 
between a frequentist and a Bayesian understanding of statistical analysis. Section 7 then 
proceeds to discuss a thought experiment that supports the introduction of Bayesian elements 
of reasoning in the given case. 
 
 
2: The Higgs Particle and its Discovery 
 
The standard model of particle physics introduces the Higgs mechanism in order to 
explain particle masses.
3
 While the conceptual success of the standard model crucially relies 
on the gauge symmetric structure of the theory, unbroken gauge symmetry doesn’t allow for 
the observed massive vector Bosons and fermionic mass spectra. It was therefore suggested in 
the 1960s that the electroweak gauge symmetry should be broken at the theory’s ground state 
while the theory’s Lagrangian remained gauge symmetric. This structural feature, which is 
                                                          
1
 It remains to be seen whether the discovered particle has the properties predicted by the 
standard model of particle physics or must be understood in terms of an extension of the 
standard model, such as supersymmetry. 
2
 Another aspect of the debate was the understanding that a mistaken announcement of a 
Higgs particle discovery would have had very serious repercussions for the public standing of 
high energy physics. This pragmatic reason for being particularly cautious in the given case 
was independent from genuine epistemic considerations and won't be addressed in the present 
paper. 
3
 The Higgs mechanism was proposed in Higgs (1964) and Englert and Brout (1964). For a 
recent survey of the historical background, see Karaca (forthcoming). 
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called ‘spontaneous symmetry breaking’, can be obtained by introducing a scalar field, the 
Higgs field, with a specific potential. After the Higgs mechanism had emerged as the only 
promising mechanism capable of reconciling gauge field theory with the observed mass 
spectrum, the striking conceptual and empirical success of the standard model established 
increasing trust in the viability of the Higgs mechanism. Once all other predictions of the 
standard model had been empirically confirmed by the mid 1990s, the Higgs particle 
remained the only standard model particle to be searched for. The LHC at CERN was build 
with the aim to test the entire parameter space where the Higgs particle could be expected to 
be found (apart from a few patches that would constitute particularly unfortunate finetuning). 
Higgs particles can be produced in deep inelastic scattering processes: particles are 
smashed together with very high kinetic energy so that, according to the laws of relativity and 
quantum physics, new kinds of particles are generated in the collision process. If the Higgs 
particle exists and particle collisions set free energies above the rest mass energy of the Higgs 
particle, Higgs particles are generated in accordance with the physical conservation laws. The 
rate of the Higgs production in collisions at a specific energy depends on the involved 
coupling constants and the phase space (the space of locations and momenta) of the possible 
experimental outcomes which involve a Higgs particle. The empirical confirmation of the 
Higgs particle in collider experiments is a particularly difficult enterprise due to the specific 
properties of the particle. Because of its high mass, the Higgs particle decays into 
energetically favoured lighter particles after a very short period of time. This time period is 
too short for generating an observable trace or gap (the standard model Higgs particle is 
electrically neutral and therefore could not generate a particle trace) in a detector. Generation 
and decay of the Higgs particle occur, for all practical purposes, at the same spot in the 
detector and must be attributed to one and the same vertex in a picture of particle traces 
extracted from the detector.  
This fact makes it very difficult to identify Higgs particles on pictures of scattering 
events. The generation and decay of a Higgs particle can never be univocally attributed to an 
individual vertex in a scattering picture. Any vertex that can be interpreted as containing a 
Higgs particle allows for a number of other interpretations which do not involve a Higgs 
particle. For that reason, the existence of the Higgs particle must be demonstrated on a 
statistical basis. The empirical analysis consists of two separate parts. First, the rates of 
specific types of events that contain vertices which might arise due to Higgs production must 
be calculated based on the known and well established theories of particle physics without 
assuming the existence of the Higgs particle. This calculated event rate is called the 
background of the process under investigation. It is then checked whether the collected data is 
compatible with the calculations of the expected background. This corresponds to testing the 
null hypothesis that assumes standard model physics without a Higgs particle. If the null 
hypothesis is excluded, physicists are justified to claim that they have observed new physics. 
The second step then consists in analysing whether the data, based on our theoretical 
knowledge, is univocally consistent with the Higgs hypothesis. If that is established, the 
collected data can be acknowledged as conclusive empirical evidence for a Higgs particle. 
 
 
3: The Look Elsewhere Effect 
 
We now want to take a closer look at the first step of the data analysis described 
above. It deals with the question whether or not the collected data implies new physics. Let us 
assume that physicists have calculated the background of the process under investigation. 
Statistical fluctuations due to the quantum nature of the process can produce events in excess 
of that expected background. Faced with a specific measured excess rate of events at a certain 
energy scale, experimentalists thus must calculate the probability that a number of events at 
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least as high as the measured number would be produced at that energy scale if the null 
hypothesis (asserting the viability of standard model physics without a Higgs particle) were 
true. That probability is called the local p-value of the data with respect to the given null-
hypothesis. If the local p-value lies below a certain limit, the null-hypothesis can be taken to 
be refuted and experimentalists are justified to speak of the discovery of new physics. Particle 
physicists have set the limit for announcing a discovery at a 5σ confidence level, which – 
expressed in terms of the Higgs search - corresponds to the condition that the probability of 
finding an excess rate of at least the measured size that is caused by standard model particles 
without a Higgs particle is lower than 3x10
-7
.  
Setting a discovery limit is, of course, a matter of convention. It is based on a trade-off 
between the advantage of calling a viable scientific claim empirically well-established and the 
potential damage of endorsing a false scientific claim. Setting discovery limits somewhere is 
necessary in order to be able to treat scientific statements as stable elements of a scientific 
world view. Without defining any limits, physicists could never claim to have discovered a 
new phenomenon in microphysics and could not define a univocal conceptual basis for the 
null hypothesis in future high energy experiments. 
In many scientific fields, a 3σ effect, which corresponds to a local p-value of 0,15%, is 
considered sufficient for inferring a new phenomenon. In particle physics, the discovery of a 
new particle is taken to be of very high importance and is used in the analysis of the 
background in all future high energy scattering experiments. Therefore the risk of erroneously 
acknowledging a discovery of a particle should be kept particularly low and a stronger 
criterion seems advisable.  
Still, a 5σ limit for discovery might seem surprisingly high at first glance. One 
important reason for this remarkably high limit has to do with a characteristic aspect of 
experimentation in high energy physics that is called the look elsewhere effect (LEE). 
Normally, experiments in high energy physics don’t just search for new phenomena at one 
specific energy scale but test a wide energy spectrum. The chances that an experiment shows 
a certain deviation from the predicted event rate at some energy scale within the tested energy 
range thus must be calculated by summing up the chances of finding it at each specific energy 
scale. The number of ‘places’ where one can find a signal is roughly given by the tested 
energy range over the width of the signal.  
To give a specific example, let us imagine that energy levels of specific events can be 
specified with the accuracy of 1 GeV and a range of 100 GeV is tested. The probability of 
finding a deviation from the predicted event rates above the 5σ limit somewhere within the 
tested energy range then is roughly 100 times the probability of finding it at one specific 
energy level. That is, the probability of getting a 5σ effect due to statistical fluctuations 
anywhere within the measured energy range is not 3x10
-7
 but rather 3x10
-5
. The latter number, 
which represents the probability of finding an excess rate beyond a given significance level 
somewhere in a chosen range of testing, is called the global p-value of the data. It is the more 
telling number than the local p-value with regard to the question whether or not one should 
reject a null hypothesis and therefore infer new physics. In our example, a global p-value of 
3x10
-5
 may be taken to be a reasonable limit for acknowledging a discovery of a new particle 
once one takes into consideration that 1) in the face of a considerable number of experimental 
tests of various kinds of new physics one wants to have a small probability that any 
announcement of a discovery is spurious and 2) it seems wise to introduce some extra error 
margin in order to account for unknown systematic errors which might distort the empirical 
data. 
The look elsewhere effect thus is one main reason for setting the significance limit for 
acknowledging a discovery as high as 5σ. Historically, the 5σ limit was established based on 
largely pragmatic considerations. While statistical fluctuations at a 4σ level did and do occur 
from time to time in high energy physics experiments, no 5σ signal in a particle experiment 
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has up to this point ever turned out to be a fluctuation.
4
 A 5σ limit therefore seemed plausible 
simply based on the historical record.
5
 The fact that 4σ fluctuations do occur can be 
statistically explained based on the number of experiments that are carried out in conjunction 
with the size of the look elsewhere effects which usually applies in those contexts.  
Let us now look specifically at the Higgs detection at the LHC. Higgs particles can be 
found at the LHC in a number of different scattering processes. Two types of process are of 
particular importance because they allow for a rather precise specification of the Higgs mass 
and have a comparably small background in conjunction with a sufficiently high Higgs 
production rate. In the first type of process, a Higgs particle is produced and decays, via a few 
intermediate steps, into a photon pair.  In the second type, the Higgs ends up decaying into 
four leptons. Both types of Higgs candidate events can be detected at the ATLAS as well as at 
the CMS detector. When CERN announced its results in December 2011, excess rates of both 
events had been measured by both detectors. The significance of the entire excess rate of both 
event types over both detectors was assessed to be somewhere close to 4σ.6 This corresponded 
to a probability close to 3x10
-5
 that the observed number of events would be generated as a 
fluctuation of standard model physics without a Higgs particle. Applying a conservative 
assessment of the energy range where a Higgs-like particle could be detected in the 
experiment, a Higgs-like particle is looked for in about 80 energy bins at the LHC. One thus 
gets a global p-value of about 2,5x10
-3
. This probability does not even amount to a 3σ effect 
and therefore was clearly insufficient for establishing the existence of a new particle. The data 
of July 2012 then had a significance above the 5σ level. This amounted to a global p-value of 
less than 3x10
-5
 and was sufficient for declaring the data a discovery of a new particle. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 This does not mean that effects that were classified as stronger than 5σ at the time of 
measurement never evaporated later on. In some cases, such effects later turned out to be 
attributable to phenomena already known. In other cases, it turned out later on that the 
assessment of the effect’s significance had been fallacious. See Franklin, forthcoming for an 
analysis of such cases. 
5
 For a survey of the early history of the 5σ criterion, see Cousins 2013. For recent takes on 
the 5σ criterion, see Feldman 2006 and Lyons 2013a.  
6
 The calculation of the overall significance of data collected in several different experiments 
is difficult and suffers from ambiguities. (See Cousins (2007) for an analysis and further 
references.) It was particularly tricky in the given case due to the fact that the characteristic 
energies of the measured excess rates did not precisely coincide. We need not go into the 
details of this analysis, however. For the present purposes it is sufficient to have an 
approximate value for the overall significance. 
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Fig.1: Diagram from (CMS 2012), showing the observed local p-values for the 
5 decay modes tested at the CMS experiment (the coloured lines) and the 
overall combination as a function of standard model Higgs mass (the black line, 
reaching 5σ at 125,5 GeV). The dashed line shows the expected local p-values 
for a standard model Higgs boson with a mass mH.  
 
 
4: Two Ways of Interpreting the Data 
 
The problem to be discussed in this paper can be seen clearly when looking at the 
situation between the first CERN announcement of a potential Higgs finding in December 
2011, and the announcement of a discovery of a scalar particle in July 2012. The official 
CERN announcement of December 2011 strictly adhered to the 5σ rule and called the data an 
indication of a possible Higgs particle that did not constitute a discovery. Some commentators 
emphasised the preliminary character of the measured effect by pointing out that 4σ effects 
had turned out to be statistical fluctuations on several occasions in the past. The understanding 
that lay behind the described kind of reasoning shall be called the experimentalist’s position 
for reasons which will become clear later on. 
Despite the official caveat, however, many particle physicists felt pretty sure already 
after the announcement of the December data that actual Higgs events had been detected. 
Some of them did present an argument for their enhanced trust in the significance of the data. 
They argued that the Higgs case differed from those contexts where 4σ effects had vanished 
after further experimental testing in the past. In the latter cases, a strong LEE had to be taken 
into account. In the Higgs case, to the contrary, one could considerably reduce the LEE 
because i) one could be quite confident for theoretical reasons that the Higgs existed and ii) 
empirically based arguments had already predicted within which energy range the Higgs 
particle should be found. Physicists who took up that position implicitly suggested that one 
should look carefully at the theoretical arguments which could constrain the LEE and, on that 
basis, determine the trustworthiness of the data beyond the rigid application of the 5σ rule. I 
want to call this position the theoretician’s position as opposed to the experimentalist’s 
position presented before.
7
  
 In order to fully understand the difference between the experimentalist’s and the 
theoretician’s’ position, we have to remember the two steps of the data analysis mentioned in 
Section 2. The first step establishes that new physics has been found by demonstrating that the 
collected data cannot be accounted for by the background alone. The second step then must 
demonstrate that the observed new physics can indeed be identified with the Higgs particle. 
The close to 4σ effect measured up to December 2011 characterises the analysis at step one. It 
can be specified without any knowledge about the Higgs particle. Keeping this part of the 
analysis free from reasoning based on the Higgs hypothesis in fact is based on a core principle 
of the experimental method: experimentalists want to keep the data analysis as independent as 
possible from the scientific concepts the data is supposed to confirm.
8
 If one wants to 
establish that a given set of data is incompatible with the well-established physics without the 
Higgs particle, it would feel like begging the question to demonstrate that fact by relying on 
                                                          
7
 The ‘unofficial’ character of the described debate makes it difficult to provide sources for 
the theoretician’s position. The debate is reflected in some of the physics blogs which 
extensively commented on the Higgs search. In some entries of 
http://takingupspacetime.wordpress.com/philosophers-of-physics-the-websites/, the CERN-
experimentalist Mauro Dorigo defends a clear form of the theoretician’s position.  
8
 See e.g. Cousins (1994), section VII. 
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theoretical reasoning that assumed the Higgs particle’s existence.9 Still, that is what the 
theoretician’s position proposes. According to the theoretician’s position it would be 
misleading to pretend that we did not have theoretical knowledge that makes us expect the 
existence of the Higgs particle. By discarding theory-based indications to that end, we may be 
experimentally flawless but do not provide a realistic picture of the way the collected data 
actually influences our trust in the Higgs particle.  
The designations experimentalist’s and theoretician’s position are not meant to imply 
that all or most experimentalists adopt the former and most theoreticians the latter position. 
Rather, it points at the positions’ core concerns. The experimentalist’s position has the priority 
to defend the purity of the process of data analysis by keeping it free of theoretical reasoning 
that is about to be tested by that very data. The theoretician’s position, to the contrary, has the 
priority to be frank about our actual beliefs with respect to the hypothesis in question. That 
belief, however, clearly does rely to a considerable extent on the theoretical knowledge we 
have about the overall situation. 
 
Before assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the two positions, we have to specify 
a little more clearly what the theoretical support for the Higgs data amounted to. This support 
was based on the understanding that a Higgs particle was likely to exist. When the LHC 
search for the Higgs particle began, the standard model was an empirically well confirmed 
theory except for the Higgs particle. Based on that fact, a seemingly cogent line of reasoning 
generated trust in the existence of a Higgs particle.  
1: It was considered highly unlikely that an empirically equally successful description 
of the physics described by the standard model could be formulated that was entirely 
independent from the principles of gauge field theory that stood behind the standard 
model. 
2: In order to make gauge field theory compatible with the data, it seemed inevitable to 
introduce a concept of spontaneous symmetry breaking.   
3: The only satisfactory way of introducing spontaneous symmetry breaking 
(disregarding the far more difficult and conceptually in some respects doubtful 
approach of ‘Higgsless models’ which were discussed in recent years) seemed to be 
the introduction of a Higgs scalar – which could be an elementary particle or a 
boundstate. 
On the described basis, high energy physicists felt highly confident about the existence of a 
Higgs scalar even in the absence of direct empirical evidence for it.  
 Now, it is important to understand that the Higgs field can have empirical effects in 
two ways. On the one hand, a Higgs particle can be produced in collisions as a real particle if 
the collision energy is high enough for generating a particle of its mass. This is the effect 
searched for at the LHC experiments. In addition, however, the Higgs field also has an effect 
on perturbative calculations of processes which do not generate real Higgs particles. Due to 
the uncertainty principle of quantum physics, calculations of perturbative corrections in 
quantum field theory must take into account contributions of ‘virtual particles’, i.e. particles 
                                                          
9
 The accusation of ‚begging the question‘ must be made more precise. Formally, attributing a 
prior probability lower than one to the hypothesis to be tested is a perfectly valid (Bayesian) 
move. Since no-one pretended to be absolutely sure about the existence of the Higgs particle 
before its discovery, the claim that the theoretician’s position amounts to begging the 
question thus cannot imply that its line of reasoning is formally invalid. Rather, it suggests 
that its line of reasoning is “dialectically ineffective” (I am grateful to Luca Moretti for 
emphasising this point and providing the term.):  to those who do not share the trust in the 
Higgs particle, the reduction of the look elsewhere effect is not plausible and the argument 
based on it cannot be convincing. 
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that could not be produced in accordance with the laws of energy and momentum 
conservation. These virtual Higgs contributions to perturbative corrections play a role already 
at energy levels that are too low for generating real Higgs particles.  The size of those effects 
of the Higgs field on scattering cross sections can be calculated. Calculations of scattering 
amplitudes which take into account virtual contributions of a Higgs particle of a given mass 
then can be compared with actual measurements of the corresponding scattering processes at 
the given energies.  
No high energy experiment before the start of the LHC provided any data that could be 
understood as an effect of virtual Higgs-contributions. This observed lack of Higgs-induced 
effects constrained the Higgs mass quite strongly already at the time the LHC experiments 
started. Based on previous data from LEP and Tevatron and early LHC data, one could set an 
upper bound of 141 GeV for the Higgs mass at 95 % confidence level before the 127 GeV 
signal had been measured (ATLAS 2011). In conjunction with the fact that earlier 
experiments had already directly excluded a Higgs mass of less than 115 GeV at 95% 
confidence level, there remained a rather small window of plausible Higgs mass values. 
Therefore, physicists had strong reasons to expect that, if a Higgs particle would be found at 
all, it should be found between 115 and 141 GeV.  
  
The described theoretical status quo had the potential to influence the evaluation of the 
empirical data on the Higgs from December 2011. The theoretician’s position suggested 
taking seriously our theoretical knowledge about the Higgs particle. First, it seemed justified 
to presume on theoretical grounds that a scalar Higgs particle was likely to exist.  Second, one 
knew that, if a Higgs particle existed, it was most likely to have a mass between 115 and 141 
GeV. A significant excess of Higgs-like events therefore could only count as a serious 
candidate for a Higgs discovery if it corresponded to a Higgs mass between 115 and 141 GeV. 
On that basis, however, a signal between 115 and 141 GeV had to be related to a very 
different look elsewhere effect than an imagined signal outside that mass window. The latter 
signal had to be treated as a potential indication of unexpected and not yet understood new 
physics whose appraisal had to account for a strong look elsewhere effect (let us say, in the 
given case, 80 bins or even more). An excess rate between 115 and 141 GeV, however, if not 
a fluctuation, was very likely caused by Higgs particle exchange. Therefore, only that energy 
range seemed relevant for specifying the LEE in an experiment that was expected to find a 
Higgs particle. Given a width of the signal of 1 GeV, this corresponded to a factor of 26, 
which increased the significance of the data from December 2011 by a factor 3. 
Strictly speaking, the argument did not depend on attributing a high absolute 
probability to the existence of the Higgs particle. It only hinged on the assumption that the 
existence of the Higgs particle was far more likely than new physics that could account for the 
observed excess rate but was not a Higgs particle.
10
 In the actual Higgs case, however (as 
arguably in most other conceivable cases where theoretical assessments can give strong 
indications for a reduction of LEE), the reasoning was based on the cogency of a specific 
theoretical approach and therefore on attributing a high absolute probability to the 
implications of that approach. Therefore, our discussion will focus on that type of reasoning. 
Contrary to the theoretician’s position, the experimentalist’s position suggests that we 
must not take into account any information about the probability of the Higgs mechanism or 
any other kind of new physics when assessing the data which is collected to confirm it. On 
that perspective, theoretical ‘prejudices’ regarding the existence of an object must not be 
responsible for announcing the discovery of that object. When disregarding all knowledge 
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 In a scenario where all new physics other than the Higgs particle were strictly excluded, 
arbitrarily small prior probabilities of the Higgs model would suffice for reducing LEE to the 
regime where a Higgs particle could be found. 
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about the probability of new physics, however, no justification remained for taking the Higgs 
particle to be more probable than so far unknown kinds of new physics that were not 
constrained to the mass window between 115 and 141 GeV. In other words, there was no 
justification to reduce the look elsewhere effect to the Higgs-mass window. The rigid 
experimentalist’s position therefore had to account for the full look elsewhere effect implied 
by the experimental setup. It thus did not generate an argument for moving away from the 
universal 5σ limit.11 
  
From the theoretician’s perspective, the look elsewhere effect could be reduced even 
further based on a more immediate reliance on the assumption of the existence of the Higgs 
particle. The data collected at the LHC until December 2011 did not merely indicate a signal 
at 125 GeV. It also excluded with 95% confidence a Higgs mass above 127 GeV. This limit 
had to be treated differently than the 141 GeV limit discussed above in an important respect. 
Since the 115-141 GeV mass window was established based on different data than the data 
that provided the measured signal itself, the fact that the measured signal was found within 
that window was not a priori guaranteed and, on that basis, could justify a different treatment 
of the actual data than what a potential measured signal outside that window would have 
required. It was possible to say: since the signal was within the mass window, it constituted a 
serious Higgs candidate; therefore the look elsewhere effect could be reduced to the energy 
range compatible with a Higgs observation. In the case of setting an upper mass limit of 127 
GeV, this line of reasoning did not work since the data that constituted the signal was also 
part of the evidence that implied the mass limit. If the overall data had been different and the 
measured signal had occurred at a different energy, let us say at 135 GeV, that data obviously 
would not have implied a mass limit of 127 GeV. Therefore, it was not true in the given case 
that a measured signal above 127 GeV would have been incompatible with a Higgs particle 
observation. The line of reasoning supporting the reduction of the look elsewhere effect that 
was presented in the previous paragraphs thus did not work this time. The look elsewhere 
effect could be reduced to the range between 115 and 127 GeV nevertheless, however, if one 
was ready to rely on the conviction that the Higgs particle existed with a high probability. 
Under this assumption, one could adhere to the following line of reasoning:  
1) It is likely that the Higgs exists (for the sake of the argument, let us assume 
the arbitrarily chosen probability of 90%
12
). 
2) With a probability of 95%, the Higgs does not have a mass below 115 or 
above 127 GeV. 
3) Therefore, with a probability of 0,90x0,95=0,855 there is a scalar field 
within that mass window, whether or not any other new physics can be 
found beyond that window. 
4) Assuming that there is a scalar within that mass window, only a signal 
within that mass window can be identified with it. Therefore, under this 
condition, it is justified to reduce the look elsewhere effect to the range 
between 115 and 127 GeV. Given the high trust in the existence of the 
Higgs particle (and once again assuming a width of the signal of 1 GeV), we 
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 Since any specification of LEE in a particular experimental context must rely on some 
theoretical considerations based on the theory to be tested, the experimentalist’s position 
arguably suggests a general tendency to stick to the default position of a rigid universal 
discovery condition rather than allow for a conceptual analysis of the individual experimental 
context. 
12
 While this may seem high, it is not unrealistic. It would not have been difficult in 2010 to 
find high energy physicists who would have accepted 9:1 odds for bets on the Higgs 
discovery at the LHC. 
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thus can reduce the look elsewhere effect to a factor close to 12 (with our 
chosen probability we would have 0,855x12+0,145x26≈14.)   
The look elsewhere effect is then reduced by another factor 2. Since this second step of 
reducing the look elsewhere effect is directly based on a high probability of the Higgs 
hypothesis, it is ‘theoretically contaminated’ to a higher degree than the first one and thus 
even less acceptable from an experimentalist’s position. 
 Both steps in conjunction reduced the look elsewhere effect by a factor 6. The 
significance of the data when taking into account the look elsewhere effect thus would have 
increased from a less than 3σ effect when seen from the experimentalist’s position to an effect 
well beyond the 3σ limit.13  
 
 
5: The Significance of the Debate 
 
 Why is the discussion between the experimentalist’s and the theoretician’s’ position of 
interest? It is not relevant any more for the assessment of the Higgs data since the evidence 
collected in 2012 amounted to the discovery of a Higgs particle on any account. In order to 
understand why the importance of the discussion goes beyond that of an anecdote during the 
process of Higgs data collection, we first have to define the character of the debate at a 
slightly more general level. The question at stake is whether it makes sense to specify 
discovery limits individually for specific experimental searches based on knowledge about 
and trust in the theory to be tested in the given cases.  
This question emerged in the context of the Higgs search for the first time as a serious 
matter of debate. At early stages of HEP experimental testing, there were general debates on 
meaningful discovery limits but they were not addressed from this specific angle. Two 
reasons are mainly responsible for the fact that the topic became interesting in the context of 
the Higgs search. 
First, there is the issue of time frames. As long as the process of data collection for 
establishing a new particle is a matter of hours, days or even a few weeks, it does not make 
much sense to start a ‘philosophical’ discussion about the status of an intermediate result of a 
specific data collecting process or to analyse the significance of the data by analysing the 
details of LEE in the given case. Applying a general rule of thumb, which eventually 
crystallized into the rigid 5σ discovery criterion, thus used to be the method of choice for 
everyone involved. The search for the Higgs particle, due to its technical and conceptual 
complexity, required fairly long time scales. The announcement of evidence for the Higgs 
particle came three years after the experiment had started and it took another seven months 
until a discovery could be announced. This was a sufficiently large time frame for justifying 
an official announcement of evidence for the Higgs particle that did not yet amount to a 
discovery, which made an individual discussion of statistical aspects of the Higgs case 
plausible.  
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 Both, the full as well as the theoretically constrained LEE are sometimes accounted for in 
the experimental literature in stating global p-vales. ATLAS 2012, p. 15, after giving the local 
p-value for the Higgs candidate signal, also  state a global p-value “taking into account the 
entire mass range of the search, 110-600 GeV”. In CMS 2012, p 41, global p-values in the 
search ranges 115-130 GeV and 110-140 GeV are stated. Those are the search ranges 
determined by constraints from perturbative corrections of other HEP processes and from the 
Higgs search-based exclusion of Higgs masses, respectively. Neither of the cited papers, 
however, suggests that global p-values could or should be factorized into the ‘official’ 
discovery limit that hinges on local p-values.   
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The second issue is the degree of trust in the theory to be tested. As discussed in 
Section 4, a (comparably) high degree of trust in a theory’s predictions is a precondition for 
the theoretician’s position to make sense. In early high energy physics, experiments mostly 
discovered new particles that had not been predicted by theory at all. Only with the 
establishment of internal symmetries and gauge theory did theory become sufficiently strong 
for making physicists highly confident about the existence of conjectured particles before they 
were experimentally discovered. And only on that basis the distinction between the 
experimentalist’s and the theoretician’s position became meaningful.14  
 Long timeframes of empirical searches as well as considerable levels of trust in 
empirically unconfirmed theories are characteristic of the overall evolution of fundamental 
physics today. Supersymmetry, which constitutes a possible structural characteristic of high 
energy physics that would imply the existence of a wide range of new elementary particles 
and may be found at the LHC within the next decade, would be far more difficult to establish 
conclusively than the Higgs particle. It would presumably take several years to get from the 
first indication of supersymmetry to an announcement of its conclusive confirmation.
15
 
Empirical confirmation of other, more far-reaching theoretical hypotheses in fundamental 
physics like cosmic inflation or string theory, to the extent it will be achieved at all, must be 
expected to require even longer timeframes and presumably will be based on complex 
patterns of cosmological data that are less conclusive than the data extracted from collider 
physics.  
In all those cases, theoretical arguments make theoreticians instil a certain level of 
confidence in the viability of the respective theories (though none of the mentioned cases 
makes physicists as confident as they were in the Higgs case). Fundamental physics thus has 
entered a stage where theories are considered likely viable first for theoretical reasons and, if 
any evidence for them is going be discovered, the presence of significant but inconclusive 
evidential support for individual theories will constitute the status quo for many years or even 
decades. The discussion about the status of the Higgs data in this light may be seen as a test 
case for a debate that is due to arise with more urgency in the foreseeable future: to what 
extent is it legitimate to move away from the canonical experimentalist’s position in cases 
where physics 1) can rely on a strong and cogent theoretical analysis of the overall physical 
context and 2) must specify the status of its theories based on inconclusive data for periods of 
time which may approach the length of an individual scientific career? To be sure, the 
specifics of the discussion of the Higgs discovery case won’t fully apply to most new contexts 
in high energy physics and cosmology. Nevertheless, the Higgs case constitutes a first 
example where a specific way of going beyond the experimentalist’s position can be laid out. 
It is on that basis that the debate on the Higgs evidence merits closer philosophical inspection. 
 
 
6: Bayesianism versus Frequentism 
 
                                                          
14
 Both stated conditions were fully fulfilled during the search for the top quark. The reasons 
why the debate on LEE did not arise in that case have to do with the specifics of the 
experimental setup which were not favourable to a discussion of LEE. 
15
 This long timeframe is caused by the complex problem of identifying specific particles as 
an expression of SUSY once they are discovered, A potential modified assessment of LEE 
with respect to the discovery of an individual SUSY candidate would not significantly reduce 
that timeframe. Still, if SUSY candidates are discovered at all, situations reminiscent of the 
Higgs case may emerge at later stages of the search for SUSY particles. 
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The debate between the experimentalist’s and the theoretician’s position can be understood in 
terms of a conflict between a rigidly frequentist and a partially Bayesian perspective. Let us 
first briefly characterize a Bayesian and a frequentist perspective in their pure forms. The 
Bayesian approach aims at extracting probabilities of the truth of a scientific hypothesis H in 
the face of empirical evidence E based on the probabilistic relation 
 
 ( | )   ( | )
 ( )
 ( )
 
 
where T denotes the statement that hypothesis H is true. Empirical evidence E is taken to 
confirm H iff it increases the probability that H is true, that is iff 
 
 ( | )    ( ) 
 
The prior probability P(T) can be informed by old empirical data, theoretical considerations or 
prejudice. The posterior extracted from considering one set of data E can serve as a prior for 
the next step of empirical testing. To get started with the empirical process, however, the 
scientist has to assume a prior that is not based on empirical tests of the given hypothesis. For 
that reason, the Bayesian perspective always contains a subjective element.  
 From a Bayesian perspective, the scientific process can nevertheless be seen as inter-
subjectively reliable. This conclusion is based on a specific property of Bayesian theory 
confirmation: under plausible conditions, repeated consideration of new empirical data leads 
to converging posterior probabilities. Starting from very different prior probabilities for a 
theory H that offers statistical predictions of E, after a sufficiently extensive series of 
empirical tests agents end up with very similar posteriors if they agree on the empirical 
implications of the theory’s alternatives Hi.
16
  
The frequentist approach has a different focus than Bayesianism. While Bayesianism 
aims at modelling a full and coherent argumentative structure that starts from the assessment 
of the probability of prior assumptions and ends with the assessment of the probability of a 
hypothesis in the face of all known data, the frequentist approach aims at isolating the 
statistical analysis of numerically well-specified empirical data from vague assessments of 
priors. The frequentist carries out a statistical analysis of the empirical data within a given 
conceptual framework that is taken for granted but without relying on any information about 
the prior probability of the hypothesis to be tested. On that basis, precise statistical analysis 
can, within a given conceptual framework, determine a theory’s likelihood, which directly 
corresponds to P(E|T).
17
 From the likelihood the theory’s p-value can be extracted, which in 
turn is taken as an indicator of the theory’s viability.  
The problem of the frequentist approach is that it does not specify the probability of 
the tested hypothesis. There is an ongoing debate on whether, and if so, how, frequentist 
analysis nevertheless supports an inductive inference to the tested hypothesis. One influential 
philosophical position, developed by Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos (Mayo 1996, Mayo and 
Spanos 2006) and applied to high energy physics by Kent Staley (Staley 2004) suggests that a 
frequentist analysis allows for the assessment of the severity of an empirical test. On that 
account, a hypothesis that has survived severe testing can be inductively inferred without any 
reference to the probability of the hypothesis. Most experimental high energy physicists, 
however, implicitly assume an epistemic Bayesian embedding of their frequentist analysis. 
                                                          
16
 including the so-called catch-all hypothesis. 
17
 Unlike the Bayesian P(E|T), the frequentist likelihood is no conditional probability. To 
mark that difference, it is normally written in a slightly different notation than the Bayesian 
P(E|T). The distinction is of no importance for the discussion of this paper, however. 
13 
 
That is, they think that a signal that is highly significant based on frequentist data analysis can 
be interpreted in terms of a high probability of the viability of a corresponding physical 
hypothesis. This can be justified to a certain extent by the convergence behaviour of P(T|E) 
under repeated empirical testing. On this view, the experimentalist who infers a hypothesis 
based on frequentist data analysis relies on the understanding that the impact of subjective 
priors is eventually ‘washed out’ by empirical data. 
Applied to the Higgs search at the LHC experiments, the frequentist analysis takes for 
granted the empirically well confirmed parts of the standard model of particle physics plus a 
wide range of scientific concepts in collider physics as the basis for analysing the data. It does 
not, however, admit any information that relies on the assessment that the Higgs particle is 
likely to exist. The frequentist perspective therefore resembles the canonical experimentalist’s 
position.   
A Bayesian perspective on the Higgs search, to the contrary, would acknowledge that 
the analysis of specific experiments at the LHC may be based on informed priors for the 
existence of the Higgs particle. These priors are themselves based on previously collected 
empirical data and theoretical reasoning relying on that data. Since a long and elaborate 
scientific process has led up to the emergence of those priors, they must not be understood as 
entirely subjective, even though the specific values attributed to them by individual scientists 
may differ to some degree due to subjectively chosen presumptions. In other words, the 
scientists’ trust in the existence of the Higgs particle before the start of LHC experiments can 
be understood as the result of a scientifically informed assessment rather than of mere 
subjective prejudice.  
 A full realization of a Bayesian perspective on the Higgs search would need to extract 
the posterior probability of the null-hypothesis P(TN|E) from P(E|TN) by specifying the prior 
probability P(TN) and P(E). In order to give a quantitative example, let us imagine that 
physicists collect empirical evidence at the LHC that implies P(E|TN)=0,01. The Bayesian 
now takes into account that we strongly believed in the Higgs particle already before the 
experiment, and, let us say, attributed a probability of 90% to its existence. Therefore, we 
excluded the null hypothesis with at least 90% probability from the start. Assuming the 
simplified scenario that the Higgs hypothesis is the only plausible alternative to the null-
hypothesis, we write P(TN)≈0,1.
18
 Given that we strongly expect E if the Higgs exists, we 
have P(E)≈0,9, which gives  
 
P(TN|E)=P(E|TN)P(TN)/P(E)≈0,01x(1/9)≈0,0011. 
 
(For the sake of simplicity, we have ignored LEE at this point. It will enter the picture below.) 
A Bayesian approach thus would generate a considerably higher degree of trust in the Higgs 
particle than the frequentist statistical analysis of the numerical data.  
 Though Bayesian approaches are being discussed in experimental high energy physics 
in order to get better understanding of the overall process (see e.g. Cousins 1994, 2013, Read 
2002, Lyons 2013), no physicist would propose to replace the frequentist statistical analysis 
by a consistently Bayesian line of reasoning that fully accounts for the physicists’ prior 
expectations. The motives for that restraint are very clear. By establishing the Bayesian 
analysis of the research process as a fully viable strategy of scientific data analysis, one would 
permit that a rigid quantitative statistical analysis where the numerical input is well-
determined by the empirical data gets adulterated by probability assessments which are vague 
and subjective. It would put guessing priors on the same footing as rigid and quantitative 
experimental testing.  
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 Attributing a significant probability to other kinds of new physics while keeping the trust in 
the Higgs at 90% would further decrease the posterior probability of TN. 
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 The theoretician’s perspective constitutes a less intrusive way of introducing aspects 
of Bayesian reasoning into data analysis. The approach remains within the general framework 
of frequentist testing. Therefore, it avoids messing with the objective character of statistical 
data analysis itself. However, it acknowledges the general relevance of attributing 
probabilities to the truth or viability of theories and therefore, in principle, accepts the 
viability of Bayesian reasoning. On that basis, a defender of the theoretician’s perspective 
will presumably endorse the idea that frequentist hypothesis testing can justify inference to 
the tested hypothesis based on the Bayesian convergence theorems (see above). Being 
sympathetic to Bayesian reasoning while remaining sceptical about allowing it to corrupt the 
objective character of data analysis naturally suggests using elements of Bayesian reasoning 
when thinking about discovery criteria, which, as emphasised in Section 3, are based on 
subjective choices anyway.  
Let us briefly restate the theoretician’s perspective on LEE in a Bayesian framework. 
The discovery criterion specifies a certain significance level of the data, which corresponds to 
a certain local p-value. This local p-value is calculated by integrating the probabilities P(E|TN) 
for excess rates E at least as high as the measured rate. The choice of a meaningful discovery 
criterion, however, must depend on the global p-value, which takes into account LEE. The 
global p-value is extracted from the local p-value by multiplication with a look elsewhere 
factor <LEE> that, in the given case, corresponds to the number of energy bins where a signal 
could have been found just as well. Now the theoretician’s position consists in assessing the 
size of LEE based on the prior expectation that the Higgs particle probably exists. By 
specifying prior probabilities for the truth of the Higgs hypothesis, we can thus explicitly 
weight the reduced LEE by our degree of trust in the Higgs hypothesis. The most 
straightforward way of doing this is to write
19
:  
 
                                  (        (  )           (   )) .                          
(1) 
  
        and          denote the LEE factors under the assumption that the Higgs 
hypothesis is true and under the assumption that it is false, respectively. P(T~H) ≥ P(TN) must 
be satisfied. Strong trust in the truth of hypothesis H (i.e. high  (  )) in conjunction with a 
factor        that is reduced compared to the factor          implies a reduced 
value of       and therefore a reduced global p-value.  
The theoretician’s perspective thus amounts to a partial inclusion of Bayesian 
reasoning by introducing P(TH) into the assessment of the data. No Bayesian updating that 
leads from P(TH) to a determination of P(TH|E) takes place, however. Bayesian priors are used 
solely for assessing the size of LEE and, on that basis, eventually for influencing the 
assessment of the significance of the collected data. If this strategy were consensually 
accepted in the research field, it would suggest the quantitative specification of individual 
discovery limits in specific experimental contexts. Those limits would explicitly rely on 
global p-values extracted based on the theory based assessment of the given experimental 
context. It is a drawback of the described approach that it constitutes a peculiar hybrid of 
Bayesian and frequentist strategies of reasoning.  Its main advantage consists in accounting 
for the Bayesian element of human reasoning to a certain degree without compromising the 
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 This simple model is not based on a fully Bayesian reconstruction of LEE (which is not 
carried out in this paper.) A fully Bayesian reconstruction would show a stronger dominance 
of reduced LEE which would extend even to cases where P(H) is of similar size as P(~H) 
(Dawid, forthcoming).   
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methodological purity of scientific data analysis in its core regime. Vague and subjective prior 
probabilities are used only within the interpretational part of data analysis that is vague and 
subjective anyway.  
In the debate on the December 2011 data, considerations which in effect amounted to 
the described line of reasoning were made in a fairly informal way in order to justify one’s 
own subjective trust in the data. No-one proposed using the described ‘weak’ deployment of 
Bayesianism ‘officially’ for the specification of a LEE-dependent discovery criterion that 
could replace the rigid 5σ criterion. In principle, however, an altered context of 
experimentation where the conceptual background is deemed very trustworthy and the time 
scales for the collection of conclusive empirical data are very high, might suggest the latter 
step as a reasonable way to go.  
A closer look at the characteristics of empirical testing in high energy physics, further 
strengthens the case for the deployment of elements of Bayesian reasoning in scientific data 
analysis. As it turns out, in specific contexts a dogmatic adherence to frequentist principles 
fails to be consistent with elementary scientific intuitions about theory confirmation. In the 
following section, an example of this kind shall be discussed. 
 
  
  
7: An Argument for Adopting the “Theoretician’s perspective” 
 
It was argued above that the plausibility of the 5σ limit directly depends on the LEE 
that happens to be relevant in today’s high energy experiments. If a significantly higher LEE 
became typical for experimentation in high energy physics, statistical fluctuations of 5σ 
significance would start showing up in experimentation. It may be expected that scientists 
would then be led to introduce a higher limit for the discovery of a particle in order to 
maintain the trustworthiness of experimental results. Note that this implication does not 
depend on whether experimentalists break up a new generation of experimental tests into a 
very large number of individual experiments that altogether test very large mass ranges or 
whether they build individual experiments that test a very large mass ranges. The crucial point 
is that the testing of very large mass ranges increases the probability of measuring very large 
fluctuations somewhere in the measured ranges. To give a specific example, if a new 
generation of experiments looked for new particles in 10 000 bins, the chances of finding a 5σ 
fluctuation in one specific large experiment of that kind would be about 3x10
-3
. It would 
clearly be premature in such a context to call a 5σ signal a discovery of a corresponding 
particle. A 6σ limit would be necessary to retain the old level of trustworthiness of 
experimentation in the new scientific context. 
Let us now imagine a theory H2 that predicts the existence of a scalar particle h with a 
mass within a parameter interval I1 and forbids the existence of a scalar particle with a mass 
within the 100 times larger interval I2. In order to test H2, physicists first build an experiment 
that scans interval I1 with 100 bins. They succeed in finding a scalar with 5σ confidence level, 
which, as experimentation still proceeds within the ‘old’ context of testing smaller energy 
ranges and therefore of a smaller LEE, constitutes the criterion for calling the data a discovery 
at the time. Later on, experimentalists develop new techniques which allow them to test far 
wider energy ranges. On that basis, they build a larger series of experiments in order to test 
the second prediction of H2. In those experiments, they scan the interval I2 with 10 000 bins 
(without providing further tests of I1) and find no further scalar, which is in perfect agreement 
with H2. Now physicists proceed to carry out an overall analysis of the entire data collected in 
all experiments. Since experimentation has entered a stage of testing wider energy ranges, it 
would be necessary to correct the limit for discovery and shift it, let us say, to 6σ. The first 
16 
 
experiment, however, does not differ structurally from the later experiments. Therefore, it 
would seem awkward to apply a different discovery criterion there than in the other 
experiments just on the basis that it came first. Once the new criterion has been established, it 
would seem plausible to apply the new 6σ criterion to the old experiment as well. However, 
the data that indicates a scalar field in interval I1 does not amount to a 6σ effect, which means 
that physicists then would not be allowed to speak of a discovery of the scalar h anymore. The 
confirmation of theory H2 by the observation that no scalar exists in I2 thus, in effect, would 
have invalidated the discovery of the phenomenon h that is predicted by H2. An implication of 
this kind clearly is at variance with our intuitive understanding of confirmation and discovery.  
 The theoretician’s perspective avoids the above implication because the trust in theory 
H2 blocks the look elsewhere effect with respect to I2. The theoretician’s perspective implies 
the following line of reasoning: the experimental testing of I1 has led to the discovery of 
scalar h and thereby has established the viability of H2 with high probability; since H2 predicts 
that no scalar particles within the mass range I2 exist, strong trust in H2 implies that I2 has 
little relevance for LEE with respect to the search for scalar particles; the experimental testing 
of I2 therefore does not significantly change the discovery condition for h and cannot 
invalidate the discovery of h. By avoiding the paradoxical conclusion suggested by the 
experimentalist’s position, the theoretician’s position looks decidedly more plausible than the 
former in the given context.
20
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 One may speculate that an experimentalist facing the described situation would indeed 
implicitly adopt the theoretician’s perspective and, on that basis, keep the 5σ criterion with 
respect to the first experiment. 
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